Home | | Cryptography and Network Security | Kerbero V4 Authentication Dialogue Message Exchange

Chapter: Cryptography and Network Security

Kerbero V4 Authentication Dialogue Message Exchange

Two additional problems remain in the more secure authentication dialogue:

Kerbero V4 Authentication Dialogue Message Exchange


Two additional problems remain in the more secure authentication dialogue:


Lifetime associated with the ticket granting ticket. If the lifetime is very short, then the user will be repeatedly asked for a password. If the lifetime is long, then the opponent has the greater opportunity for replay.  


hRequirement for the servers to authenticate themselves to users.  


The actual Kerberos protocol version 4 is as follows :


a basic third-party authentication scheme


have an Authentication Server (AS)


users initially negotiate with AS to identify self


AS provides a non-corruptible authentication credential (ticket granting ticket TGT)


have a Ticket Granting server (TGS)


users subsequently request access to other services from TGS on basis of users TGT


1 Kerberos Realms and Multiple Kerberi


A full-service Kerberos environment consisting of a Kerberos server, a number of clients, and a


number of application servers requires the following:


The Kerberos server must have the user ID and hashed passwords of all participating users in its database. All users are registered with the Kerberos server.


The Kerberos server must share a secret key with each server. All servers are registered with the Kerberos server.


Such an environment is referred to as a Kerberos realm.


The concept of realm can be explained as follows.


A Kerberos realm is a set of managed nodes that share the same Kerberos database. The Kerberos database resides on the Kerberos master computer system, which should be kept in a physically secure room.


A read-only copy of the Kerberos database might also reside on other Kerberos computer systems.


However, all changes to the database must be made on the master computer system. Changing or accessing the contents of a Kerberos database requires the Kerberos master password.


The Kerberos server in each interoperating realm shares a secret key with the server in the other realm. The two Kerberos servers are registered with each other.


The scheme requires that the Kerberos server in one realm trust the Kerberos server in the other realm to authenticate its users. Furthermore, the participating servers in the second realm must also be willing to trust the Kerberos server in the first realm.


2 Kerberos version 5


Version 5 of Kerberos provides a number of improvements over version 4.


developed in mid 1990‟s


provides improvements over v4


addresses environmental shortcomings


and technical deficiencies


specified as Internet standard RFC 151


Differences between version 4 and 5


Version 5 is intended to address the limitations of version 4 in two areas:


Environmental shortcomings  


encryption system dependence o internet protocol dependence

message byte ordering

ticket lifetime

authentication forwarding

inter-realm authenticaiton


Technical deficiencies  


double encryption


PCBC encryption o Session keys

Password attacks


The version 5 authentication dialogue


First, consider the authentication service exchange. Message (1) is a client request for a ticket-granting ticket. As before, it includes the ID of the user and the TGS. The following new elements are added:


Realm: Indicates realm of user  

Options: Used to request that certain flags be set in the returned ticket  


Times: Used by the client to request the following time settings in the ticket: from: the desired start time for the requested ticket  


till: the requested expiration time for the requested ticket rtime: requested renew-till time  


Nonce: A random value to be repeated in message (2) to assure that the response is fresh and has not been replayed by an opponent  



Message (2) returns a ticket-granting ticket, identifying information for the client, and a block encrypted using the encryption key based on the user's password.


This block includes the session key to be used between the client and the TGS, times specified in message (1), the nonce from message (1), and TGS identifying information.


The ticket itself includes the session key, identifying information for the client, the requested time values, and flags that reflect the status of this ticket and the requested options.


These flags introduce significant new functionality to version 5. For now, we defer a discussion of these flags and concentrate on the overall structure of the version 5 protocol.


Let us now compare the ticket-granting service exchange for versions 4 and 5. We see that message (3) for both versions includes an authenticator, a ticket, and the name of the requested service.


In addition, version 5 includes requested times and options for the ticket and a nonce, all with functions similar to those of message (1).


The authenticator itself is essentially the same as the one used in version 4.


Message (4) has the same structure as message (2), returning a ticket plus information needed by the client, the latter encrypted with the session key now shared by the client and the TGS.


Finally, for the client/server authentication exchange, several new features appear in version 5. In message (5), the client may request as an option that mutual authentication is required. The authenticator includes several new fields as follows:


Subkey: The client's choice for an encryption key to be used to protect this  

specific application session. If this field is omitted, the session key from the ticket (Kc,v) is used.  


Sequence number: An optional field that specifies the starting sequence number to be used by the server for messages sent to the client during this session. Messages may be sequence numbered to detect replays.  


If mutual authentication is required, the server responds with message (6). This message includes the timestamp from the authenticator. Note that in version 4, the timestamp was incremented by one. This is not necessary in version 5 because the nature of the format of messages is such that it is not possible for an opponent to create message (6) without knowledge of the appropriate encryption keys.


Ticket Flags


The flags field included in tickets in version 5 supports expanded functionality compared to that available in version 4.

Study Material, Lecturing Notes, Assignment, Reference, Wiki description explanation, brief detail
Cryptography and Network Security : Kerbero V4 Authentication Dialogue Message Exchange |

Privacy Policy, Terms and Conditions, DMCA Policy and Compliant

Copyright © 2018-2023 BrainKart.com; All Rights Reserved. Developed by Therithal info, Chennai.