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Modularity, Encapsulation, and Information Hiding
Code usually has a long shelf-life and is enhanced over time as needs change and faults are found and fixed. For this reason, a key principle of software engineering is to create a design or code in small, self-contained units, called components or modules; when a system is written this way, we say that it is modular. Modularity offers advantages for program development in general and security in particular.
If a component is isolated from the effects of other components, then it is easier to trace a problem to the fault that caused it and to limit the damage the fault causes. It is also easier to maintain the system, since changes to an isolated component do not affect other components. And it is easier to see where vulnerabilities may lie if the component is isolated. We call this isolation encapsulation.
Information hiding is another characteristic of modular software. When information is hidden, each component hides its precise implementation or some other design decision from the others. Thus, when a change is needed, the overall design can remain intact while only the necessary changes are made to particular components.
Let us look at these characteristics in more detail.
Modularization is the process of dividing a task into subtasks. This division is done on a logical or functional basis. Each component performs a separate, independent part of the task. Modularity is depicted in Figure 3-16. The goal is to have each component meet four conditions:
· single-purpose: performs one function
· small: consists of an amount of information for which a human can readily grasp both structure and content
· simple: is of a low degree of complexity so that a human can readily understand the purpose and structure of the module
· independent: performs a task isolated from other modules
Other component characteristics, such as having a single input and single output or using a limited set of programming constructs, indicate modularity. From a security standpoint, modularity should improve the likelihood that an implementation is correct.
In particular, smallness is an important quality that can help security analysts understand what each component does. That is, in good software, design and program units should be only as large as needed to perform their required functions. There are several advantages to having small, independent components.
Maintenance. If a component implements a single function, it can be replaced easily with a revised one if necessary. The new component may be needed because of a change in requirements, hardware, or environment. Sometimes the replacement is an enhancement, using a smaller, faster, more correct, or otherwise better module. The interfaces between this component and the remainder of the design or code are few and well described, so the effects of the replacement are evident.
Understandability. A system composed of many small components is usually easier to comprehend than one large, unstructured block of code.
Reuse. Components developed for one purpose can often be reused in other systems. Reuse of correct, existing design or code components can significantly reduce the difficulty of implementation and testing.
Correctness. A failure can be quickly traced to its cause if the components perform only one task each.
Testing. A single component with well-defined inputs, outputs, and function can be tested exhaustively by itself, without concern for its effects on other modules (other than the expected function and output, of course).
Security analysts must be able to understand each component as an independent unit and be assured of its limited effect on other components.
A modular component usually has high cohesion and low coupling. By cohesion, we mean that all the elements of a component have a logical and functional reason for being there; every aspect of the component is tied to the component's single purpose. A highly cohesive component has a high degree of focus on the purpose; a low degree of cohesion means that the component's contents are an unrelated jumble of actions, often put together because of time-dependencies or convenience.
Coupling refers to the degree with which a component depends on other components in the system. Thus, low or loose coupling is better than high or tight coupling because the loosely coupled components are free from unwitting interference from other components. This difference in coupling is shown in Figure 3-17.
Encapsulation hides a component's implementation details, but it does not necessarily mean complete isolation. Many components must share information with other components, usually with good reason. However, this sharing is carefully documented so that a component is affected only in known ways by others in the system. Sharing is minimized so that the fewest interfaces possible are used. Limited interfaces reduce the number of covert channels that can be constructed.
An encapsulated component's protective boundary can be translucent or transparent, as needed. Berard [BER00] notes that encapsulation is the "technique for packaging the information [inside a component] in such a way as to hide what should be hidden and make visible what is intended to be visible."
Developers who work where modularization is stressed can be sure that other components will have limited effect on the ones they write. Thus, we can think of a component as a kind of black box, with certain well-defined inputs and outputs and a well-defined function. Other components' designers do not need to know how the module completes its function; it is enough to be assured that the component performs its task in some correct manner.
This concealment is the information hiding, depicted in Figure 3-18. Information hiding is desirable because developers cannot easily and maliciously alter the components of others if they do not know how the components work.
These three characteristicsmodularity, encapsulation, and information hidingare fundamental principles of software engineering. They are also good security practices because they lead to modules that can be understood, analyzed, and trusted.
Programs are not always trustworthy. Even with an operating system to enforce access limitations, it may be impossible or infeasible to bound the access privileges of an untested program effectively. In this case, the user U is legitimately suspicious of a new program P. However, program P may be invoked by another program, Q. There is no way for Q to know that P is correct or proper, any more than a user knows that of P.
Therefore, we use the concept of mutual suspicion to describe the relationship between two programs. Mutually suspicious programs operate as if other routines in the system were malicious or incorrect. A calling program cannot trust its called subprocedures to be correct, and a called subprocedure cannot trust its calling program to be correct. Each protects its interface data so that the other has only limited access. For example, a procedure to sort the entries in a list cannot be trusted not to modify those elements, while that procedure cannot trust its caller to provide any list at all or to supply the number of elements predicted.
Confinement is a technique used by an operating system on a suspected program. A confined program is strictly limited in what system resources it can access. If a program is not trustworthy, the data it can access are strictly limited. Strong confinement would be helpful in limiting the spread of viruses. Since a virus spreads by means of transitivity and shared data, all the data and programs within a single compartment of a confined program can affect only the data and programs in the same compartment. Therefore, the virus can spread only to things in that compartment; it cannot get outside the compartment.
At your local electronics shop you can buy a combination printerscannercopierfax machine. It comes at a good price (compared to costs of the four separate components) because there is considerable overlap in functionality among those four. It is compact, and you need only install one thing on your system, not four. But if any part of it fails, you lose a lot of capabilities all at once.
Related to the argument for modularity and information hiding and reuse or interchangeability of software components, some people recommend genetic diversity: it is risky having many components of a system come from one source, they say.
Geer at al. [GEE03a] wrote a report examining the monoculture of computing dominated by one manufacturer: Microsoft today, IBM yesterday, unknown tomorrow. They look at the parallel in agriculture where an entire crop is vulnerable to a single pathogen. Malicious code from the Morris worm to the Code Red virus was especially harmful because a significant proportion of the world's computers ran versions of the same operating systems (Unix for Morris, Windows for Code Red). Geer refined the argument in [GEE03b], which was debated by Whitaker [WHI03b] and Aucsmith [AUC03].
Tight integration of products is a similar concern. The Windows operating system is tightly linked to Internet Explorer, the Office Suite, and the Outlook e-mail handler. A vulnerability in one of these can also affect the others. Because of the tight integration, fixing a vulnerability in one can have an impact on the others, whereas a vulnerability in another vendor's browser, for example, can affect Word only to the extent they communicate through a well-defined interface.
We turn next to the process of developing software. Certain practices and techniques can assist us in finding real and potential security flaws (as well as other faults) and fixing them before we turn the system over to the users. Pfleeger et al. [PFL01] recommend several key techniques for building what they call "solid software":
· peer reviews
· hazard analysis
· good design
· static analysis
· configuration management
· analysis of mistakes
Here, we look at each practice briefly, and we describe its relevance to security controls. We begin with peer reviews.
You have probably been doing some form of review for as many years as you have been writing code: desk-checking your work or asking a colleague to look over a routine to ferret out any problems. Today, a software review is associated with several formal process steps to make it more effective, and we review any artifact of the development process, not just code. But the essence of a review remains the same: sharing a product with colleagues able to comment about its correctness. There are careful distinctions among three types of peer reviews:
Review: The artifact is presented informally to a team of reviewers; the goal is consensus and buy-in before development proceeds further.
Walk-through: The artifact is presented to the team by its creator, who leads and controls the discussion. Here, education is the goal, and the focus is on learning about a single document.
Inspection: This more formal process is a detailed analysis in which the artifact is checked against a prepared list of concerns. The creator does not lead the discussion, and the fault identification and correction are often controlled by statistical measurements.
A wise engineer who finds a fault can deal with it in at least three ways:
· by learning how, when, and why errors occur
· by taking action to prevent mistakes
· by scrutinizing products to find the instances and effects of errors that were missed
Peer reviews address this problem directly. Unfortunately, many organizations give only lip service to peer review, and reviews are still not part of mainstream software engineering activities.
But there are compelling reasons to do reviews. An overwhelming amount of evidence suggests that various types of peer review in software engineering can be extraordinarily effective. For example, early studies at Hewlett-Packard in the 1980s revealed that those developers performing peer review on their projects enjoyed a significant advantage over those relying only on traditional dynamic testing techniques, whether black box or white box. Figure 3 -19 compares the fault discovery rate (that is, faults discovered per hour) among white-box testing, black-box testing, inspections, and software execution. It is clear that inspections discovered far more faults in the same period of time than other alternatives. This result is particularly compelling for large, secure systems, where live running for fault discovery may not be an option.
Researchers and practitioners have repeatedly shown the effectiveness of reviews. For instance, Jones [JON91] summarized the data in his large repository of project information to paint a picture of how reviews and inspections find faults relative to other discovery activities. Because products vary so wildly by size, Table 3-6 presents the fault discovery rates relative to the number of thousands of lines of code in the delivered product.
The inspection process involves several important steps: planning, individual preparation, a logging meeting, rework, and reinspection. Details about how to perform reviews and inspections can be found in software engineering books such as [PFL01] and [PFL06a].
During the review process, someone should keep careful track of what each reviewer discovers and how quickly he or she discovers it. This log suggests not only whether particular reviewers need training but also whether certain kinds of faults are harder to find than others. Additionally, a root cause analysis for each fault found may reveal that the fault could have been discovered earlier in the process. For example, a requirements fault that surfaces during a code review should probably have been found during a requirements review. If there are no requirements reviews, you can start performing them. If there are requirements reviews, you can examine why this fault was missed and then improve the requirements review process.
The fault log can also be used to build a checklist of items to be sought in future reviews. The review team can use the checklist as a basis for questioning what can go wrong and where. In particular, the checklist can remind the team of security breaches, such as unchecked buffer overflows, that should be caught and fixed before the system is placed in the field. A rigorous design or code review can locate trapdoors, Trojan horses, salami attacks, worms, viruses, and other program flaws. A crafty programmer can conceal some of these flaws, but the chance of discovery rises when competent programmers review the design and code, especially when the components are small and encapsulated. Management should use demanding reviews throughout development to ensure the ultimate security of the programs.
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