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In Chapter 6 we described the process and some of the security and privacy issues of data mining. Here we consider how to maintain privacy in the context of data mining.
Private sector data mining is a lucrative and rapidly growing industry. The more data collected, the more opportunities for learning from various aggregations. Determining trends, market preferences, and characteristics may be good because they lead to an efficient and effective market. But people become sensitive if the private information becomes known without permission.
Government Data Mining
Especially troubling to some people is the prospect of government data mining. We believe we can stop excesses and intrusive behavior of private companies by the courts, unwanted publicity, or other forms of pressure. It is much more difficult to stop the government. In many examples governments or rulers have taken retribution against citizens deemed to be enemies, and some of those examples come from presumably responsible democracies. Much government data collection and analysis occurs without publicity; some programs are just not announced and others are intentionally kept secret. Thus, citizens have a fear of what unchecked government can do. Citizens' fears are increased because data mining is not perfect or exact, and as many people know, correcting erroneous data held by the government is next to impossible.
Privacy-Preserving Data Mining
Because data mining does threaten privacy, researchers have looked into ways to protect privacy during data mining operations. A naïve and ineffective approach is trying to remove all identifying information from databases being mined. Sometimes, however, the identifying information is precisely the goal of data mining. More importantly, as the preceding example from Sweeney showed, identification may be possible even when the overt identifying information is removed from a database.
Data mining has two approachescorrelation and aggregation. We examine techniques to preserve privacy with each of those approaches.
Privacy for Correlation
Correlation involves joining databases on common fields. As in a previous example, the facts that someone is named Erin and someone has diabetes have privacy significance only if the link between Erin and diabetes exists. Privacy preservation for correlation attempts to control that linkage.
Vaidya and Clifton [VAI04] discuss data perturbation as a way to prevent privacy-endangering correlation. As a simplistic example, assume two databases contain only three records, as shown in Table 10-1. The ID field linking these databases makes it easy to see that Erin has diabetes.
One form of data perturbation involves swapping data fields to prevent linking of records. Swapping the values Erin and Geoff (but not the ID values) breaks the linkage of Erin to diabetes. Other properties of the databases are preserved: Three patients have actual names and three conditions accurately describe the patients. Swapping all data values can prevent useful analysis, but limited swapping balances privacy and accuracy. With our example of swapping just Erin and Geoff, you still know that one of the participants has diabetes, but you cannot know if Geoff (who now has ID=1) has been swapped or not. Because you cannot know if a value has been swapped, you cannot assume any such correlation you derive is true.
Our example of three data points is, of course, too small for a realistic data mining application, but we constructed it just to show how value swapping would be done. Consider a more realistic example on larger databases. Instead of names we might have addresses, and the purpose of the data mining would be to determine if there is a correlation between a neighborhood and an illness, such as measles. Swapping all addresses would defeat the ability to draw any correct conclusions regarding neighborhood. Swapping a small but significant number of addresses would introduce uncertainty to preserve privacy. Some measles patients might be swapped out of the high-incidence neighborhoods, but other measles patients would also be swapped in. If the neighborhood has a higher incidence than the general population, random swapping would cause more losses than gains, thereby reducing the strength of the correlation. After value swapping an already weak correlation might become so weak as to be statistically insignificant. But a previously strong correlation would still be significant, just not as strong.
Thus value-swapping is a technique that can help to achieve some degrees of privacy and accuracy under data mining.
Privacy for Aggregation
Aggregation need not directly threaten privacy. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, an aggregate (such as sum, median, or count) often depends on so many data items that the sensitivity of any single contributing item is hidden. Government statistics show this well: Census data, labor statistics, and school results show trends and patterns for groups (such as a neighborhood or school district) but do not violate the privacy of any single person.
As we explained in Chapter 6, inference and aggregation attacks work better nearer the ends of the distribution. If there are very few or very many points in a database subset, a small number of equations may disclose private data. The mean of one data value is that value exactly. With three data values, the means of each pair yield three equations in three unknowns, which you know can be solved easily with linear algebra. A similar approach works for very large subsets, such as (n-3) values. Mid-sized subsets preserve privacy quite well. So privacy is maintained with the rule of n items, over k percent, as described in Chapter 6.
Data perturbation works for aggregation, as well. With perturbation you add a small positive or negative error term to each data value. Agrawal and Srikant [AGR00] show that given the distribution of data after perturbation and given the distribution of added errors, it is possible to determine the distribution (not the values) of the underlying data. The underlying distribution is often what researchers want. This result demonstrates that data perturbation can help protect privacy without sacrificing the accuracy of results.
Vaidya and Clifton [VAI04) also describe a method by which databases can be partitioned to preserve privacy. Our trivial example in Table 10-1 could be an example of a database that was partitioned vertically to separate the sensitive association of name and condition.
Summary of Data Mining and Privacy
As we have described in this section, data mining and privacy are not mutually exclusive: We can derive results from data mining without sacrificing privacy. True, some accuracy is lost with perturbation. A counterargument is that the weakening of confidence in conclusions most seriously affects weak results; strong conclusions become only marginally less strong. Additional research will likely produce additional techniques for preserving privacy during data mining operations.
We can derive results without sacrificing privacy, but privacy will not exist automatically. The techniques described here must be applied by people who understand and respect privacy implications. Left unchecked, data mining has the potential to undermine privacy. Security professionals need to continue to press for privacy in data mining applications.
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